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HESITATIONS ABOUT SPECIAL DIVINE ACTION:




Abstract. The new interest in special divine action has led to a close reading 
of the great debates and discussions of the early modern period in an attempt 
to understand contemporary resistance to the notion of divine action, and to 
develop strategies for reaffirming the notion in a  refined manner. Although 
continuing engagement with and evaluation of the Humean legacy on miracles 
and divine action will be of central importance to this programme of review, 
there are other issues that also need to be addressed. In this article I  identify 
some of the factors that have caused or continue to cause difficulties for the 
articulation of a concept of special divine action and I suggest how they might 
be engaged.
The last two decades have witnessed a renewed surge of interest in the 
question of whether, and to what extent, God may be said to act in the 
world. Can God be understood to act entirely in and through the regular 
structures and capacities of nature, or does a robust account of divine 
action also require us to affirm that God acts specially in order to redirect 
the course of events in the natural world, thus delivering outcomes that 
would not have occurred if God had not acted in this way? Although 
this discussion is sometimes framed in terms of a  generic notion of 
divinity,1 the most significant recent engagements with the question 
have reflected Judeo-Christian conceptions of God, and the questions 
arising from these.
The language of divine action is integral to both Old and New 
Testaments. The God of Israel is regularly and definitively depicted and 
1 See, for example, Jeffrey Koperski, The Physics of Theism: God, Physics, and the 
Philosophy of Science (New Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), pp. 146-65.
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described as a  God who acts in history.2 God’s identity and character 
are understood to be made visible in the sphere of human action and 
reflection.3 This concentration on God’s actions in nature and history 
could lead to the neglect of important themes (such as the more subtle 
unobtrusive forms of divine activity in everyday experience), as well as 
creating an essentially impersonal notion of God as a spiritual force.4 Yet 
despite these important qualifications, Israel understood and represented 
God as one who acted in nature and in history.5 The New Testament 
maintains this tradition, and focuses it on the life, death and resurrection 
of Jesus of Nazareth.6
So how do we account for this resurgence of interest in the question of 
divine activity? One factor is the increasing awareness of the inadequacy 
of the theologies of the 1960s to accommodate this notion. The noted 
theologian and philosopher Ian T. Ramsey (1915-72) was alarmed at 
the failure of the 1960s to recognize the importance of affirming divine 
activity. To lose sight of this central theme, he argued, was to drift into 
a  theological atheism.7 There was a  need for ‘justified talk of God’s 
activity’ if the situation was to be retrieved. Process thought began to 
emerge around this time as a potential solution to this dilemma, offering 
an approach to divine activity which seemed to meet at least some of 
the inadequacies of the regnant neo-Orthodoxy within Protestantism.8 
2 For a good review of the primary and secondary sources on this point, see Terence 
E. Fretheim, ‘The God Who Acts: An  Old Testament Perspective’, Theology Today, 54 
(1997), 6-18.
3 The narrative of God’s action is thus seen as disclosing or ‘rendering’ God’s character: 
see, for example, David Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1975), pp. 39-50.
4 See the comments in Fretheim, ‘The God Who Acts’, p. 7. For a detailed examination 
of one such instance of divine action, see William Stacy Johnson, ‘God’s Ordering, 
Providing, and Caring for the World’, Theology Today, 54 (1997), 29-42.
5 For an analysis, see William Paul Griffin, The God of the Prophets: An Analysis of 
Divine Action (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), pp. 76-191.
6 See, for example, N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (London: SPCK, 
2003), pp. 20-8; Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to 
Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.  152-5; Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 
Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and Authorship (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 33-80; Denis Edwards, How God Acts: Creation, 
Redemption, and Special Divine Action (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), pp. 57-141.
7 Ian T. Ramsey, Models for Divine Activity (London: SCM Press, 1973), pp. 56-66.
8  Gary J. Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology: Crisis, Irony, and 
Postmodernity, 1950-2005 (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), p. 204. 
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Modern Pentecostal theologians have developed theories of divine action 
within the world based on the complex activity of the Holy Spirit, which 
ultimately transcends frameworks of interpretation.9 Other readings of 
the Christian tradition which offer an  illuminating engagement with 
the theme of divine action include Thomist accounts of God’s agency 
in nature, which have been widely applied to physical and biological 
processes.10 Recent accounts of Aquinas’s concept of causality suggest 
that, while some questions need to be addressed, this is likely to remain 
a fertile field of exploration in the near future.11
The extended project of interdisciplinary conferences and publications 
entitled ‘Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action’ (1988-2003) is 
a  particularly good example of this renewed interest in the notion of 
divine action. This project – generally referred to simply as the ‘Divine 
Action Project’ [DAP]  – brought together scholars from the fields of 
natural science, philosophy, and theology in a sustained discussion over 
a period of fifteen years to consider whether the notion of divine action 
remained meaningful and defensible. Important though this project may 
have been, particularly in identifying and evaluating possibilities, its 
constructive outcomes remain unclear, even elusive, as may be seen from 
the concerns expressed in a retrospective volume published to mark the 
formal end of the project.12 There is clearly a need for further exploration 
For further discussion, see David Ray Griffin, Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: 
A Process Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).
9 Amos Yong, The Spirit of Creation: Modern Science and Divine Action in the 
Pentecostal-Charismatic Imagination (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), pp. 72-137. 
Ramsey also notes the importance of such Spirit-based approaches: Ramsey, Models for 
Divine Activity, pp. 1-14.
10 Armand Maurer, ‘Darwin, Thomists, and Secondary Causality’, Review of 
Metaphysics, 57 (2004), 491-515; William E. Carroll, ‘Divine Agency, Contemporary 
Physics, and the Autonomy of Nature’, Heythrop Journal, 49 (2008), 582-602. For 
contemporary critiques of the idea of secondary causality, see Alfred J. Freddoso, 
‘Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature,’ in Divine 
and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, ed. by Thomas V. Morris (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 74-118. For early modern concerns about such 
notions of causality, see J. A. van Ruler, The Crisis of Causality: Voetius and Descartes on 
God, Nature, and Change (Leiden: Brill, 1995), pp. 107-66.
11 See especially Michael J. Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action: Contemporary Science & 
Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012).
12 Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and William R. Stoeger, S.J., eds. Scientific 
Perspectives on Divine Action: Twenty Years of Challenge and Progress (Vatican City State: 
Vatican Observatory, and Berkeley, CA: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences,  
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of the issues. Since the affirmation of the existence of God does not entail 
that this God should act in any way – whether ‘special’ or ‘general’ – this 
article will focus on the specific question of God’s activity, not the more 
general (and quite distinct) question of God’s existence.
A  central theme of recent discussions of special divine action has 
been the reassessment of David Hume’s arguments against miracles. It is 
well known that there are difficulties with these arguments – such as the 
problematic definition of the term ‘miracle’, Hume’s limiting conception 
of a  law of nature, and his somewhat unconvincing description of the 
evidence for natural laws and the role of historical testimony.13 These 
revisionary readings of Hume, particularly when taken in conjunction 
with the criticisms of Hume developed by his contemporaries, are likely 
to create an intellectual environment more hospitable to the notion of 
special divine action.
So how is the notion of divine action to be sustained, in the light of 
multiple suspicions of the notion on the one hand, and continuing interest 
in it on the other? There is no doubt of this interest and commitment, 
and of the willingness on the part of scholars to engage the issues at 
stake, including the important question of whether the conventional 
distinction between ‘general divine action’ and ‘special divine action’ can 
be maintained.14
2008). For an  assessment of the project, see Wesley J. Wildman, ‘The Divine Action 
Project, 1988–2003’, Theology and Science, 2 (2004), 31-75; F. LeRon Shults, Nancey C. 
Murphy, and Robert J. Russell, Philosophy, Science and Divine Action (Leiden: Brill, 2009); 
Leigh C. Vicens, ‘On the Possibility of Special Divine Action in a Deterministic World’, 
Religious Studies, 48 (2012), 315-36. Vicens’ analysis should be read alongside the earlier 
reflections of Arthur R. Peacocke, ‘God’s Interaction with the World: The Implications of 
Deterministic “Chaos” and of Interconnected and Interdependent Complexity’, in Chaos 
and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. by Robert J. Russell, Nancey 
Murphy and Arthur R. Peacocke (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, and Berkeley, 
CA: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1995), pp. 263-88.
13  John Earman, Hume’s Abject Failure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
For a  response, see Robert J. Fogelin, A Defense of Hume on Miracles (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2003); Peter Millican, ‘Earman on Hume on Miracles’, in 
Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses, ed. by 
Stewart Duncan and Antonia LoLordo (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 271-84. See also 
Aviezer Tucker, ‘Miracles, Historical Testimonies, and Probabilities’, History and Theory, 
44 (2005), 373-90; Graham H. Twelftree, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Miracles 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
14  See especially the concerns noted in Niels H. Gregersen, ‘Special Divine Action 
and the Quilt of Laws: Why the Distinction between Special and General Divine Action 
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This article identifies some of the chief concerns that underlie 
resistance to the notion of ‘special divine action’, and reflects on how 
these can be engaged. Although these concerns can be allocated to the 
broad categories of culture, the natural sciences, and theology, these 
boundaries are porous and poorly defined and policed. While the 
importance of philosophical arguments for the topic under consideration 
will be obvious, this article will focus on three additional fields which 
have in the past raised certain difficulties for the notion of special divine 
action: culture, the natural sciences, and Christian theology.
I. CULTURAL CONCERNS ABOUT SPECIAL DIVINE ACTION
The notion of special divine action caused relatively little mental 
discomfort in the Middle Ages and Renaissance; indeed, the notion 
of special divine action in healing or other miraculous events lay at 
the heart of much popular religion of the age.15 In England, Catholic 
attempts to rebuff the growing influence of Protestantism were often 
linked with an  appeal to miracles wrought by saints or through relics 
as a sign of God’s presence and favour.16 Yet this would gradually give 
way to a  marked cultural disinclination to take the notion of special 
divine action seriously, discounting this as superstition or the vestiges of 
an outdated popular religiosity which had no place in the modern world. 
One of the reasons for the rise of ‘natural theology’ in British Protestant 
religious thought of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was 
the presumption that God did not act directly within nature, but that 
God’s wisdom in creation – understood as a past event – could be seen 
from an  intelligent and committed study of the world of nature.17 The 
natural theology of the modern age offered an apologetic for faith based 
on the assumption that God had acted in the past, reflecting a growing 
Cannot Be Maintained’, in Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action: Twenty Years of 
Challenge and Progress, pp. 179-99. There are some interesting parallels here with the 
distinction between ‘general’ and ‘special’ revelation in systematic theology, which 
cannot be explored further here: for these concepts, see Gerald O’Collins, Rethinking 
Fundamental Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 56-92.
15  Jane Shaw, Miracles in Enlightenment England (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2006).
16 Alexandra Walsham, ‘Miracles and the Counter Reformation Mission to England’, 
Historical Journal, 46 (2003), 779-815.
17 Alister E. McGrath, Darwinism and the Divine: Evolutionary Thought and Natural 
Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), pp. 56-74.
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cultural disinclination to believe in direct divine action in the present.18
The philosopher Charles Taylor rightly asks how this transition is 
to be explained. ‘Why was it virtually impossible not to believe in God 
in, say, 1500 in our Western society, while in 2000 many of us find this 
not only easy, but even inescapable?’19 Taylor’s answer is presented in 
terms of the social dominance of a cluster of modern prejudices which 
he designates ‘The Immanent Frame’. This cultural metanarrative weaves 
together a  number of themes, including the disenchantment of the 
world, an understanding of nature as an  impersonal order, the rise of 
an  ‘exclusive humanism’, and an  ethics which is framed primarily in 
terms of discipline, rules, and norms.
Taylor notes that this ‘exclusive humanism’ advocates a view of human 
flourishing which denies or suppresses any notion of a  transcendent 
source of morality, such as God or the Tao, and which refuses to recognize 
any good beyond this life and world. The outcome of the dominance of 
this narrative is the cultural exclusion of a transcendent reality in general, 
particularly the notion of a God who can be considered to act within the 
world. For Taylor, contemporary understandings of human flourishing, 
the natural order, and the moral life, and nature are all framed in a self-
sufficient, naturalistic, and immanent manner.20
Being rational now comes to mean taking some distance from ordinary, 
embodied human existence and striving to acquire mastery over the 
self and the world. The disengagement that this involves is mental or 
intellectual; the mind tries to prescind from its involvement in ordinary 
existence and aspires to a more detached, disinterested perspective on 
the world.
18 A  good example is William Paley’s Evidences of Christianity (1794), which 
affirms the apologetic and evidential importance of miracles in the apostolic period, 
but without any expectation that they recur outside that era. Paley’s rebuttal of David 
Hume’s critique of miracles in this work merits close study, especially in relation to the 
theme of ‘special divine action’. See, for example, Michael J. McClymond, Encounters 
with God: An Approach to the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), pp. 85-8.
19 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007), p. 25. For 
assessments of Taylor’s approach, see Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen, and 
Craig J. Calhoun, eds., Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010); Carlos D. Colorado, and Justin D. Klassen, eds., Aspiring to 
Fullness in a Secular Age: Essays on Religion and Theology in the Work of Charles Taylor 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014).
20 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 149.
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Echoes of Taylor’s analysis can be found in older critics of western culture. 
For example, C. S. Lewis’s writings of the 1940s show a growing anxiety 
over signs that the category of the transcendent was being intentionally 
sidelined within English intellectual life. His Abolition of Man (1943) 
noted how the educational system of the day seemed designed to 
eradicate any intuitions of transcendence in morality or religion.21 The 
sermon ‘The Weight of Glory’ (1941) asserts that people are now held 
spellbound, caught up in a secular and secularising metanarrative that 
insists that human destiny and good lie in this world alone. We are told – 
and come to believe – that the ideas of transcendent realms, of worlds 
to come, are simply illusions. The educational system, Lewis notes with 
obvious sadness, has colluded with the modern myth that the sources 
and goals of human good are ‘found on this earth’.22
Lewis declares that the time has come to break free from this ‘evil 
enchantment of worldliness’. Lewis has no doubt about what has to be 
done. So deeply has this ‘evil enchantment’ saturated English culture that 
the ‘strongest spell’ is needed if its power is to be broken. Lewis reminds 
his readers that ‘spells are used for breaking enchantments as well as for 
inducing them’. For Lewis, Christianity has to show that it can tell a more 
compelling and engaging story that will capture the imagination of its 
culture. In the end, of course, Lewis provided such a counter-narrative 
in his Chronicles of Narnia.
Taylor’s point is that the culture of our ‘secular age’ now makes a sharp 
distinction between the natural and the supernatural, the human and 
the divine, so that making sense of the world around us now seems to 
be possible in terms of this world alone. Nature became emptied of the 
spirits, signs, and cosmic purposes that once seemed a fact of everyday 
experience. It came to be conceived fundamentally as an  impersonal 
order of matter and force, governed by causal laws, making the notion 
of special divine action counterintuitive, if not conceptually incredible. 
Taylor notes the importance of Weber’s concept of the ‘disenchantment 
of nature’,23 while offering his own reinterpretation of this in terms of 
21 Michael D. Aeschliman, The Restitution of Man: C. S. Lewis and the Case against 
Scientism (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998).
22 C. S. Lewis, Essay Collection (London: HarperCollins, 2002), p. 99.
23 On which see Michael T. Saler, ‘Modernity, Disenchantment, and the Ironic 
Imagination’, Philosophy and Literature, 28 (2004), 137-49; Alison Stone, ‘Adorno and the 
Disenchantment of Nature’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 32 (2006), 231-53.
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‘disengagement’.24 There has been a  marked shift to ‘Closed World 
Structures’ that tacitly accept ‘the immanent frame’ as normative, seen 
in the fact that most people no longer see natural events as acts of 
God.25 Nature has become reduced to the predictable and quantifiable. 
For Taylor, this means that the dominant cultural narrative leaves no 
place for the ‘vertical’ or ‘transcendent’, but in one way or another closes 
these off, renders them inaccessible, or even unthinkable. ‘Closed World 
Structures’ now function as unchallenged axioms in western culture.
Taylor here describes a cultural predisposition, an axiomatic way of 
seeing and conceiving the world, which simply excludes the notion of 
special divine action as a matter of principle. This notion is now deemed 
‘unthinkable’; to run counter to this cultural mindset is a symptom of 
a fundamental irrationality. So what can be done about it? How can this 
cultural narrative be challenged? Taylor’s response is complex, and rests 
partly on understanding how this narrative achieved social dominance 
in the first place. It involves grasping an  alternative ‘master narrative’, 
one of several ‘broad framework pictures of how history unfolds’ which 
helps us understand how ‘disenchantment’ led to the elimination of the 
transcendent.26
In exploring these issues, Taylor sets out an account of secularization 
which has analytical, phenomenological, and genealogical components.27 
Taylor’s account of the historical origins of this ‘master narrative’ 
emphasises its historical contingency. ‘It is a crucial fact of our present 
spiritual  predicament’, he declares, ‘that it is historical; that is, our 
understanding of ourselves and where we stand is partly defined by our 
24 Luc van den Berge and Stefan Ramaekers, ‘Figures of Disengagement: Charles 
Taylor, Scientific Parenting, and the Paradox of Late Modernity’, Educational Philosophy 
and Theory, 64 (2014), 607-25.
25 For a  succinct account of this notion, see Charles Taylor, ‘Geschlossene 
Weltstrukture in der Moderne’, in Wissen und Weisheit: Zwei Symposien zu Ehre von Josef 
Pieper, ed. by Hermann Fechtrup, Friedbert Schulze and Thomas Sternberg (Münster: 
LIT Verlag, 2005), pp.  137-69. Taylor’s reflections should be set alongside Alvin 
Plantinga’s comments about the problems of framing divine action within a ‘Laplacean’ 
paradigm, which assumes ‘the causal closure of the universe’: Alvin Plantinga, ‘What is 
“Intervention”?’, Theology and Science, 6 (2008), 369-401.
26 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 573.
27 For comment, see José Casanova, ‘A Secular Age: Dawn or Twilight?’, in Varieties of 
Secularism in a Secular Age, ed. by Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen and Craig 
J. Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 243-64.
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sense of having come to where we are, of having overcome a previous 
condition.’28
Taylor’s innovative and engaging account of how this cultural 
mindset developed questions the validity of what he terms ‘subtraction 
stories’, understood as ‘stories of modernity in general, and secularity in 
particular, which explain them by human beings having lost, or sloughed 
off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, confining horizons, 
or illusions, or limitations of knowledge’.29 For those committed to 
‘subtraction stories’, divine action and transcendence belong to the 
past, and have no place in the present or future. For Taylor, however, 
the western mindset remains open to the notions of transcendence and 
divine action; the problem is that it is not perceived to be so. Taylor’s 
account of the emergence of a ‘secular age’ emphasises the constitutive 
God-reference that still ‘haunts’ the secular age.
A  similar point was made by the Polish philosopher Leszek 
Kolakowski (1927-2009). ‘God’s unforgettableness’, Kolakowski argued, 
‘means that He is present even in rejection.’30 Developing this point 
further, Kolakowski suggests that the ‘return of the sacred’ is a  telling 
sign of the failure of the ersatz Enlightenment ‘religion of humanity’, in 
which a  deficient ‘godlessness desperately attempts to replace the lost 
God with something else’. Taylor concurs, arguing that this persistence of 
a God-reference should not be seen as an empty vestige, a dead metaphor, 
but rather as a sign that interest in the transcendent remains embedded 
within culture, and has the potential for future development.
Taylor’s analysis is intended to hold up a  mirror to our present, 
allowing us to discern its regnant implicit narrative  – the ‘immanent 
frame’ – and grasp that this can be understood as both ‘closed’ and ‘open’. 
The outcomes of this ‘immanent frame’ are thus not determined by the 
frame itself, but by how we choose to interpret and apply it. Taylor opts for 
an ‘open’ interpretation of the ‘immanent frame’, where Weber endorses 
a ‘closed’ reading. Both are defensible interpretations (or ‘spins’) of the 
28 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 29.
29 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 22.
30 Leszek Kolakowski, ‘Concern about God in an  Apparently Godless Age’, in My 
Correct Views on Everything, ed. by Zbigniew Janowski (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s 
Press, 2005), pp. 173-83 (p. 183). For further reflections on Kolakowski’s significance, 
see Alister E. McGrath, ‘Atheism and the Enlightenment: Reflections on the Intellectual 
Roots of the “New Atheism”’, in Mere Theology: Christian Faith and the Discipleship of the 
Mind (London: SPCK, 2010), pp. 139-54.
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‘immanent frame’; both, however, are to be seen as acts of faith, in that 
neither are demanded by this frame.31
The immanent order can, therefore, slough off the transcendent. But it 
doesn’t necessarily do so. What I have been describing as the immanent 
frame is common to all of us in the modern West, or at least that is what 
I’m trying to portray. Some of us want to live it as open to something 
beyond; some live it as closed. It is something which permits closure, 
without demanding it.
Taylor thus notes that, as a matter of fact, far from being uniformly anti-
religious or atheist, Western culture displays ‘a whole gamut of positions, 
from the most militant atheism to the most orthodox traditional theisms, 
passing through every possible position on the way’.32
So where does this leave us? What are the implications of Taylor’s 
reflections on the regnant narrative of western culture for special divine 
action? Taylor helps us to grasp that suspicion of the notion of special 
divine action rests partly on a dominant cultural narrative, rather than 
specifically philosophical objections. The ‘immanent frame’ is the default 
position for contemporary discussion of these issues; it is shaped, in part, 
by philosophical considerations, but has developed a plausibility which 
goes beyond its philosophical roots. It is impossible to debate the issue 
of divine action without taking account of this cultural predisposition 
against this notion. ‘We have here what Wittgenstein calls a  “picture”, 
a background to our thinking, within whose terms it is carried on, but 
which is often largely unformulated and to which we can frequently, just 
for this reason, imagine no alternative.’33
If Taylor is right, the plausibility of special divine action is shaped 
by cultural pressures and imaginative constructions which ultimately 
transcend the rational arguments which underlie it. The best way 
of engaging a  closed reading of the ‘immanent frame’ is to provide 
an imaginatively compelling alternative, which is seen to have rational 
plausibility. To revert to the language of C. S. Lewis, noted earlier, we 
need to break the ‘spell’ of a closed world system, and open up alternative 
readings of our world – and perhaps that is best done, not by rational 
argument, but by capturing the cultural imagination with a richer and 
deeper vision of reality.
31 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 544.
32 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 556.
33 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 549.
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II. SCIENTIFIC CONCERNS ABOUT SPECIAL DIVINE ACTION
The debate about special divine action takes place against a framework 
of scientific discourse, framed in terms of the ‘laws of nature’, which raise 
significant Humean concerns about the notion of divine ‘interference’ 
with the regular structures of the world.34 With the benefit of hindsight, 
it can now be seen that the important ‘Divine Action Project’, noted 
earlier, was haunted by the fear that interventionist approaches to divine 
action seemed to call into question the validity of the laws of nature.35
The ‘divine action project’ tried to be sensitive to issues of theological 
consistency. For example, the idea of God sustaining nature and its 
law-like regularities with one hand while miraculously intervening, 
abrogating, or ignoring those regularities with the other hand struck 
most members as dangerously close to outright contradiction. Most 
participants certainly felt that God would not create an  orderly world 
in which it was impossible for the creator to act without violating the 
created structures of order.
The concern within the Divine Action Project was to secure an account 
of divine action in the world that had scientific ‘traction’, while at the 
same time maintained maximal continuity with traditional views on 
God’s action within the world.36 Three main approaches emerged within 
the Divine Action Project, as follows. They are not to be considered 
as mutually exclusive, in that each could be considered to represent 
a perspective on the question.
(1) Quantum Theory. A number of writers within the DAP – particularly 
Robert John Russell and George Ellis – argued that special divine action 
could be conceived as taking place at the quantum level.37 God can be 
34 See the influential article by John W. Carroll, ‘The Humean Tradition’, Philosophical 
Review, 99 (1990), 185-219. For his mature views, see John W. Carroll, ‘Nailed to Hume’s 
Cross’, in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, ed. by Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, 
and Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), pp. 67-81.
35 Wesley J. Wildman, ‘The Divine Action Project, 1988–2003’, Theology and Science, 
2 (2004), 31-75; quotation at p. 38. See further Thomas F. Tracy, ‘Scientific Perspectives 
on Divine Action? Mapping the Options’, Theology and Science, 2 (2004), 196-201. For 
a  more critical assessment, see Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
36 Philip Clayton, ‘Towards a Theory of Divine Action That Has Traction’, in Scientific 
Perspectives on Divine Action: Twenty Years of Challenge and Progress, pp. 85-110.
37 For a collection of essays assessing Russell’s approach, see Ted Peters and Nathan 
Hallanger, eds., God’s Action in Nature’s World (Basingstoke: Ashgate, 2006).
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understood to act in the world by determining quantum events within 
the ordinary probability patterns, which permit wide variation in their 
outcomes. Divine action could thus be envisaged in terms of God’s micro-
management of otherwise indeterminate quantum processes and events, 
whose outcomes eventually percolate through to the macroscopic world.
(2) Complexity Approaches. Divine action is here understood as God 
working in a  ‘top-down’ manner, such as by influencing the boundary 
conditions of the natural world, or by influencing conscious embodied 
human beings. Arthur Peacocke was particularly influential in developing 
the notion of a  ‘top-down’ causality, by which God’s intentions and 
purposes are implemented in the shaping of particular events, or patterns 
of events, without any abrogation of the laws of nature.38
(3) Chaos Theory. John Polkinghorne has championed the potential for 
chaos theory to illuminate divine action, noting the exquisite sensitivity 
of chaotic systems to their initial conditions.39 Although Polkinghorne 
recognises the potential of chaos theory as a  means of positing 
metaphysical openness within nature, he cautions that the ‘grave and 
unresolved difficulties of relating quantum theory to chaos theory’ 
cannot be overlooked.
These three models of divine action have achieved prominence in 
recent discussions of divine action influenced by scientific considerations, 
and should be set alongside alternatives – such as the Pentecostal and 
Thomist approaches. There are clearly viable, even fruitful, options 
open to those wishing to defend the notion of divine action, including 
special divine action, in a scientific context. But what challenges do such 
approaches face? Two major issues emerge in discussion, and will be 
38 Arthur R. Peacocke, ‘God’s Interaction with the World: The Implications of 
Deterministic “Chaos” and of Interconnected and Interdependent Complexity’, in Chaos 
and Complexity. Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. by Robert J. Russell, Nancey 
Murphy and Arthur R. Peacocke (Vatican City: Vatican Observatory, 1995), pp. 263-88. 
See further Taede A. Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God: Divine Action and Scientism 
(Louvain: Peeters, 2004), pp. 107-71. Peacocke earlier advocated an ‘embodied’ approach 
to divine causality: Arthur Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), pp. 142-207.
39 Ignacio Silva, ‘John Polkinghorne on Divine Action: A  Coherent Theological 
Evolution’, Science and Christian Belief, 24 (2012), 19-30. Polkinghorne’s views on this 
question have shifted over time, but can be studied from John Polkinghorne, ‘The 
Metaphysics of Divine Action’, in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine 
Action, ed. by Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy and Arthur R. Peacocke (Vatican City: 
Vatican Observatory, 1995), pp. 147-56.
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considered further in this article: the notion of ‘laws of nature’ which 
govern the universe, and the question of how divine action within nature 
might be recognized empirically.
One of the most fundamental problems facing the notion of ‘special 
divine action’ is that this stands in apparent contradiction to the notion 
of the laws of nature. The Newtonian emphasis on the regularity of 
nature, particularly when coupled with the growing trend to conceive 
nature as analogous to the mechanism of a clock, created difficulties for 
any notion of divine intervention within the natural world. Intervention 
entailed disruption of the natural order. Isaac Newton thus took the view 
that miracles  – perhaps the most familiar instance of alleged special 
divine action  – were to be considered an  impossibility.40 Newton had 
no difficulty with the idea that God has established the ‘laws of nature’; 
he was concerned, however, over the notion that God might break these 
laws, in what seemed to him to be an act of potential anarchy. The ‘laws 
of nature’ thus came to be interpreted as denying causal openness in the 
structures of nature.41
This hostility towards special divine action is clearly mirrored in 
Newton’s religious writings. He regarded accounts of miracles in the 
early church as ‘feigned’, and argued that the biblical accounts of miracles 
were more concerned with the infrequency of their occurrence, rather 
than their supposed divine origins.42 Many theologians of the eighteenth 
century  – such as Jonathan Edwards  – regarded Newton’s view of the 
world, and particularly of God as Pantokrator, as subversive of traditional 
belief, not least because of its seeming inhospitality to any notion of 
divine action beyond the primordial act of creation.43
Yet however distasteful Newton’s idea of a fixed order of nature might 
appear to some theologians, others found it conducive to social stability. 
Newton’s notion of a  law-giving God who created a universe which is 
regulated and governed in a  lawlike manner was easily integrated into 
40 Peter Harrison, ‘Newtonian Science, Miracles, and the Laws of Nature’, Journal of 
the History of Ideas, 56 (1995), 531-53.
41 For alternative approaches which retain a degree of causal openness, see Kile Jones, 
‘Falsifiability and Traction in Theories of Divine Action’, Zygon, 45 (2010), 575-89.
42 For a detailed analysis, see James E. Force, ‘Providence and Newton’s Pantokrator: 
Natural Law, Miracles, and Newtonian Science’, in Newton and Newtonianism: New 
Essays, ed. by James E. Force and Sarah Hutton (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), pp. 65-92.
43 Avihu Zakai, Jonathan Edwards’ Philosophy of Nature: The Re-Enchantment of the 
World in the Age of Scientific Reasoning (London: T & T Clark, 2010), pp. 163-205.
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social, as much as scientific, thinking.44 At a  time when England had 
experienced intense social upheaval in the seventeenth century through 
the Civil War and the ‘Glorious Revolution’, Newton’s approach seemed 
to offer a vision of the world in which the regularity of the natural and 
social orders complemented and reinforced each other. Special divine 
action was too easily interpreted in terms of divine interruption or 
dislocation of the settled physical and social order, and came to be 
associated with a  religiously-motivated political radicalism for which 
eighteenth-century England had no taste. The ‘laws of nature’ were thus 
interpreted as denying causal openness in the structures of nature.
Although the ‘laws of nature’ were primarily conceived in relation 
to the physical world, writers such as William Paley emphasised the 
law-like patterns of behaviour observed within the biological world.45 
Paley’s notion of divine action is essentially static, framed in terms of 
a given, designed, unchanging order to things, established in the past. 
Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859) made use of the notion of the 
‘laws impressed on matter by the Creator’, a  theme which was given 
a significantly higher profile in the second edition of the Origin of Species 
than in the first.46 Darwin’s approach at this point led to him being 
compared to Newton; just as Newton had uncovered the laws governing 
the worlds of astronomy and physics, so Darwin had uncovered those 
governing the biological world.47
Such conception of the ‘laws of nature’ implies a causally closed world, 
within which special divine action is impossible. Yet is this conception 
right? What if we ought to think of the ‘laws of nature’ as descriptive, 
rather than prescriptive?48 As enumerations of observations, rather than 
as stipulations of behaviour? The classical conception of science, which 
became preeminent during the Enlightenment, regarded science as the 
44 Neal C. Gillespie, ‘Natural History, Natural Theology, and Social Order: John Ray 
and the “Newtonian Ideology”’, Journal of the History of Biology, 20 (1987), 1-49.
45 John T. Baldwin, ‘God and the World: William Paley’s Argument from Perfection 
Tradition – A Continuing Influence’, Harvard Theological Review, 85 (1992), 109-20.
46 John Hedley Brooke, ‘“Laws Impressed on Matter by the Creator”? The Origins and 
the Question of Religion’, in The Cambridge Companion to the “Origin of Species”, ed. by 
Michael Ruse and Robert J. Richards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
pp. 256-74.
47 John F. Cornell, ‘Newton of the Grassblade? Darwin and the Problem of Organic 
Teleology’, Isis, 77 (1986), 405-21.
48 There is a large literature. A good starting point is Ronald N. Giere, Science without 
Laws (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
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rational pursuit of universal laws of nature. Yet this is being increasingly 
challenged, not least because of the growing realization of the value-
laden particulars of social constructivism which can be seen at work 
within the scientific enterprise. For some, the ‘laws of nature’ are to be 
seen as relations of necessity between universals;49 for others, they are 
generalizations which figure in the most economical true axiomatization 
of all our observations of the world.50 Serious questions arise as to 
whether the laws of nature can be said to ‘govern’ anything.51
Contemporary debates about the ‘laws of nature’ have moved beyond 
Newton’s rather limited and limiting notion, all too easily linked to a deist 
theology and a determinist metaphysics. The regularities of nature can 
be affirmed without entailing either of these two unsatisfactory beliefs. 
One might, for example, think of Nancy Cartwright’s emphasis on the 
natural capacities of domain-specific systems, or Peter Lipton’s ceteris 
paribus laws.52 Perhaps more importantly, thinking of the ‘laws of nature’ 
in regularist rather than necessitarian terms significantly diminishes the 
difficulties in speaking of special divine action.53 ‘The validity of most 
laws  – even of a  fundamental physical kind  – is compatible with the 
existence of exceptional situations.’54
A  second major concern arises from the question of how special 
divine action is to be recognized. Although this question has been given 
relatively little attention in recent discussions,55 it serves to emphasise 
the importance of empirical observation in relation to the theme of 
special divine action. Can general divine action and special divine action 
be distinguished empirically? Is the concept of divine action – whether 
49 David M. Armstrong, What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983).
50 Frank P. Ramsey, ‘Universals of Law and Fact’, in Foundations, ed. by D. H. Mellor 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 128-32.
51 Helen Beebee, ‘The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 61 (2000), 571-94. For a response, see John T. Roberts, The 
Law-Governed Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
52 On the former, see Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries 
of Science (Cambridge, UK New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999); ‘God’s 
Order, Man’s Order and the Order of Nature’, Euresis, 5 (2013), 99-108. On the latter, see 
Peter Lipton, ‘All Else Being Equal’, Philosophy, 74 (1999), 155-68.
53 As pointed out by Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, p. 62.
54 Max Kistler, ‘Laws of Nature, Exceptions and Tropes’, Philosophia Scientiae, 7 
(2003), 189-219; quotation at p. 192.
55 See, for example, Paul Gwynne, Special Divine Action: Key Issues in the Contemporary 
Debate, 1965-1995 (Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1996), pp. 133-8.
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special or general  – an  objective reality or a  subjective perception?56 
There are certainly concerns about whether the distinction can be 
maintained beyond the level of normative definition. The concern here, 
however, goes deeper. How are we to understand the relation between 
theological depictions of the world as the locus of divine action and 
scientific descriptions of the world as an intelligible structure of natural 
law, based on empirical observation?
Divine action – whether special or general – is not observed, precisely 
because it is not observable. Events in the natural world are observed, 
which may be – but do not necessarily demand to be – interpreted as 
instances of divine action, whether general or special. The distinction 
between the two types of divine action is either to be grounded in the 
realm of theological a priori, or as a matter of intuition. The distinction 
between special and general divine action is somewhat intuitive. General 
divine action is normally intuited to mean something like God’s ‘usual’ 
activity in creating and sustaining the whole world, including the 
establishment of the laws of nature. Special divine action could be defined 
in terms of God’s ‘extraordinary’ or particular providential activity 
within the world, especially as it affects the course of human history and 
the lives of individual people. These distinctions do not arise, necessarily 
or plausibly, from the empirical observation of the natural world.
The language of special divine action is difficult, and perhaps 
impossible, to translate into the language and conceptualities of the 
natural sciences. Inevitably, this leads to the suggestion that contemporary 
debates about scientific perspectives on special divine action essentially 
amount to attempts to accommodate an  essentially theological  – 
and non-empirical  – notion within the conceptual interstices of 
a scientific understanding of the world. They add nothing to a scientific 
understanding of the world, and risk being seen merely as a parallel way 
of conceiving the world, along the lines of the unhelpful framework of 
‘non-overlapping magisteria’ proposed by Stephen Jay Gould.57
Both these questions are capable of being engaged more fully, and 
we can look forward to some important discussions in the future. Yet 
we must now turn to a relatively neglected theme, as we consider how 
56 Paul Gwynne, Special Divine Action, p. 33. The ‘subjective perception’ thesis is 
developed in detail in Maurice F. Wiles, God’s Action in the World (London: SCM Press, 
1986).
57 Stephen Jay Gould, ‘Nonoverlapping Magisteria’, Natural History, 106 (1997), 16-22.
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certain theological developments have had a significant impact on this 
discussion.
III. THEOLOGICAL CONCERNS ABOUT SPECIAL DIVINE ACTION
Earlier in this chapter, we noted Isaac Newton’s reluctance to allow any 
form of divine intervention within the world. In part, this reflects his views 
on the causal structures of the world, expressed in his laws of motion. 
Yet it is important to note that Newton vigorously rejected a  notion 
of God which entailed action within the world – namely, a Trinitarian 
conception of God. Newton’s anti-Trinitarianism became well-known 
after his death, although he went to some pains to conceal it during his 
own lifetime.58 Although scholars have tended to focus on the rational 
and scientific motivations for this outlook, it is important to emphasise 
that this emphasis on the foundations of Newton’s anti-Trinitarianism 
have led to a failure to deal adequately with its consequences.
Newton’s views were, in certain ways, typical of his age. Most leading 
theologians of the seventeenth century seem to have held on to the 
doctrine of the Trinity out of respect for tradition,59 while privately 
conceding that it seemed irrational in the light of the growing emphasis 
upon the ‘reasonableness of Christianity’, and that it seemed to provide 
little in the way of spiritual or theological benefits.60 While simplifications 
are dangerous, defence of this doctrine seems to have been seen as being 
little more than a formal expectation on the part of orthodox theologians.
Why is this observation important? Because the doctrine of the 
Trinity provided an  intellectual framework that safeguarded an  active 
conception of God, providing a bulwark against a reduced generic notion 
of divinity which limited action to the creation and ordering of the world. 
The twentieth-century theologian Emil Brunner spoke of the Trinity as 
a ‘security doctrine (Schutzlehre)’, protecting Christian theology against 
deficient notions of God.61 The theological generations to follow Newton 
58 The best study is Scott Mandelbrote, ‘Eighteenth-Century Reactions to Newton’s 
Anti-Trinitarianism’, in Newton and Newtonianism: New Studies, pp. 93-112.
59 Philip Dixon, Nice and Hot Disputes: The Doctrine of the Trinity in the Seventeenth 
Century (London: T & T Clark, 2003).
60 Paul Chang-Ha Lim, Mystery Unveiled: The Crisis of the Trinity in Early Modern 
England, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
61 Emil Brunner, Dogmatik I: Die christliche Lehre von Gott (Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 
1959), p. 206.
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tended to adopt an essentially deist notion of God in their public defence 
of Christianity. Having set to one side an incarnational notion of God 
entering into the world, and any notion of the Holy Spirit as God’s activity 
within the world, they were left with the notion of a God who designed 
and created the world, and thereafter ceased to be involved in it.
This is perhaps seen most clearly in William Paley’s Natural Theology 
(1802), which speaks of God as an  ‘artificer’  – that is, someone who 
designs and creates – but which pointedly declined to allow any further 
divine involvement with the natural order, even if this seemed to evacuate 
the concept of providence of any meaning. Paley was fascinated with the 
intricate structures of the human body and other biological organisms;62 
nevertheless, he interpreted this in terms of God’s past activity, which 
was taken to imply God’s continuing existence. Paley’s lack of interest in 
the concept of the Trinity – which, it must be noted, was representative of 
his age – denied him access to a concept of God which affirmed ongoing 
divine presence and activity within the world.
Today, the doctrine of the Trinity is central to Christian theological 
discourse. The work of theologians such as Karl Barth and Karl Rahner 
has led to a major exercise of theological retrieval, in which the doctrine 
of the Trinity has been reaffirmed, along with its implications for divine 
action and presence within the world.63 As we saw earlier, Christianity 
has always known and affirmed God as one who acts within the world; 
the problem was that the theology of the modern period adopted 
a rationally maximised notion of God which secured cultural compliance 
and conformity at the price of suppressing any expectation that God 
might act. The emergence of the Pentecostal movement in the twentieth 
century represents a  further correction of this inadequate means of 
conceiving God.
So where does this leave us? It does not resolve the intellectual issues 
that we have noted in this paper about the plausibility of the notion of 
special divine action. Nevertheless, it does present us with a vision of 
God which encourages us to expect such action, and hence be more 
responsive towards developing frameworks within which such action 
may be accommodated.64 It also provides a  framework for integrating 
62 Fernando Vidal, ‘Extraordinary Bodies and the Physicotheological Imagination’, in 
The Face of Nature in Enlightenment Europe, ed. by Lorraine Daston and Gianna Pomata 
(Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2003), pp. 61-96.
63 See Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins, eds., The Trinity: 
An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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general and special divine action, holding them together as notionally 
distinguishable yet functionally inseparable aspects of God’s relationship 
with the world.
Yet there remain questions about the traction of a Trinitarian notion 
of God within western culture in general, and popular Christian culture 
in particular. Is this retrieval of Trinitarianism limited to academic 
theology, or has it a wider impact in popular Christianity? It is important 
to note that there are good reasons for thinking that a generalized and 
generic deism  – similar to that of the ‘Age of Reason’  – has gained 
considerable influence in the west since the Second World War, partly 
as a  means of positioning Christianity, Judaism, and Islam within 
a common theological matrix that enabled maximal social inclusivity.
Robert Bellah’s observations about the emergence of ‘American civil 
religion’ during the 1960s should be noted here.65 The phenomenon 
of civil religion requires maximum commonality, which in turn leads 
to an  emphasis on the ‘lowest common denominator’ of religions 
and a  corresponding de-emphasis of the distinctive features of  – for 
example – a Trinitarian concept of God. This is not a cultural innovation, 
in that one of the original motivations for embracing a  minimalist 
deism in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe was its potential 
for maximizing religious and social cohesion within religiously divided 
or variegated contexts.66 This ‘civil religion’ prefers to think of God as 
a moral legislator, rather than as someone who actively intervenes in the 
natural or social processes.67
A  more recent development within American popular culture has 
been the adoption of what some have called a  ‘moralistic therapeutic 
deism’ on the part of some younger Christians.68 This understanding 
64 See the points made in Christoph Schwoebel, God: Action and Revelation (Kampen: 
Kok Pharos, 1992), pp.  42-4; Andreas Loos, ‘Divine Action and the Trinity: A  Brief 
Exploration of the Grounds of Trinitarian Speech About God in the Theology of Adolf 
Schlatter’, International Journal of Systematic Theology, 4 (2003), 255-77.
65 Robert Bellah, ‘Civil Religion in America’, Daedalus, 96 (1967), 1-21.
66 Ronald Beiner, ‘Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau on Civil Religion’, Review of 
Politics, 55 (1993), 617-38. Note also the issues explored by Patrick Giddy, ‘Special Divine 
Action and How to Do Philosophy of Religion’, South African Journal of Philosophy, 30 
(2011), 143-54.
67 See further Robert Corfe, Deism and Social Ethics: The Role of Religion in the Third 
Millennium (New York: Arena Books, 2007).
68 This phrase was introduced by the sociologists Christian Smith and Melina 
Lundquist Denton, Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 118-71.
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of religion as a  positive moral and therapeutic factor in life tends to 
marginalize the creedal and theological dimensions of faith, and speaks 
of divine intervention primarily – though not exclusively – in terms of 
the correction or amelioration of personal narratives. It remains unclear 
what the longer term influence of this trend may be, both in terms of 
its cultural influence and its potential impact on a  future generation’s 
reflections on the notion of special divine action.
CONCLUSION
The new interest in special divine action has led to a close reading of the 
great debates and discussions of the early modern period in an attempt 
to understand contemporary resistance to the notion of divine action, 
and to develop strategies for reaffirming the notion in a refined manner. 
Although continuing engagement with and evaluation of the Humean 
legacy on miracles and divine action will be of central importance to 
this programme of review, there are other issues that also need to be 
addressed. This article has tried to identify some of the factors that have 
caused or continue to cause difficulties for the articulation of a concept 
of special divine action and how they might be engaged, as a means of 
encouraging the conversation to move beyond the framework of the 
‘Divine Action Project’ into new approaches and paradigms.
